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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MEETING OF NORTH

CAROLINA

BAR ASSOCIATION-The

1925

Annual Meeting of the North Carolina Bar Association will be held
on July 1, 2 and 3 at Asheville, with headquarters at the new Battery

Park Hotel. Beginning at 8:30 P. M. on Wednesday, July 1st., the
sessions will continue throughout Thursday and end on Friday
morning. One of the most interesting features of the Meeting will
be the motor trip to the top of Mt. Mitchell, following the close of
the Friday morning session. The start is scheduled for ten o'clock,
and a luncheon will be given by the Buncombe County Bar. Those
attending the Meeting may be assured of a good time in addition
to an excellent program.
The principal event of the first session, at 8:30 P. M. on Wednesday, is the address of the President of the North Carolina Bar
Association, Hon. G. V. Cowper of Kinston, on "The Administration of Justice in North Carolina, its Difficulties and Suggested
Remedies."
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At the morning session on Thursday, July 2nd., at 9:30 o'clock,
the following addresses will be made:
"The Cape Fear Bar," by Hon. John D. Bellamy.
"The Practise of Peace," by Hon. Daniel W. Iddings of Dayton,
Ohio.
"The Judiciary," by Hon. J. H. Dillard.
At this session, matters of large significance to the Bar of North
Carolina will be presented by Chief Justice W. P. Stacy in his report
of the Judicial Conference.
- The Thursday afternoon session at 3 o'clock will be given over
to a Legal Round Table Conference, with the following interesting
topics for discussion:
1. What should be the educational prerequisites for admission to
the Bar? Led by George E. Butler of Clinton.
2. How can we relieve the congestion of our court dockets? Led
by Louis M. Bourne of Asheville.
3. What should be done to improve our jury system? Led by
Associate Justice L. R. Varser.
From 5:00 to 7:00 P. M., there will be a Garden Party by Hon.
Mark W. Brown and Mrs. Brown at their residence, "Many Oaks."
Following this at 8:30 P. M., there will be an address by Hon. Finis
J. Garrett, of Tennessee, on "Amendments to the Federal Constitution."
A business session on Friday morning at 9:15 and election of
officers will bring the 1925 Bar Association Meeting to a close. The
accessibility of Asheville, the interesting program and the good time
which is assured merits a large attendance.
.Loss OF CONSORTrIUM IN NORTH CAROLINA-The right of one
spouse to recover for the loss of the consortium 1 of the other has
gone through many changes in North Carolina before arriving at
the present holding in Hinnant v. Power Company.2
At common law this right existed only in the husband since he
was regarded as the dominant member of the marital union. He was
entitled to his wife's custody, her services, and her conjugal affection; and any infringement of these gave rise to a cause of action
in him, as thereby his rights were directly infringed upon. It made
'Bouvier defines this as "The right of the husband and wife respectively to
the conjugal fellowship, company, co6peration and aid of the other."
See, "The Change in the Meaning of Consortium" by Evans Holbreok, 22
Mich. L. Rev. 1.
'Hinnant v. Power Co. (1924) 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307.
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no difference if the interference of the husband's rights was intentional or caused by negligence. If the proprietary rights of the husband were infringed upon it was a direct injury to him for which
he could recover.
The wife at common law did not have any legal right to her
husband's consortium. Blackstone, after discussing the rights of
action of the "superior party" for the dissolution or any breach of
the marital relation, says, "the inferior hath no kind of property in
the company, 'care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is
held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can
suffer no loss or injury." 3 Also the wife could not bring suit in her
own name, and any recovery would have gone to the husband, since
he was entitled to all her personal property. So if the wife was
allowed to sue in her own name for an intentional invasion of the
marriage relation (as adultery, alienation of affections, etc.) whereby
she suffered through the loss of the husband's consortium, it would
amount to the husband deriving benefit for his own wrong, as he
necessarily was a guilty party thereto; and if the wife was allowed
to recover for an unintentional interference (as negligent injury,
etc.) it would amount to the husband recovering twice for the same
injury, as he also had a right of action therefor.
The Married Womens Acts 4 greatly changed the idea of consortium. Recovery by the husband is still allowed for loss of
consortium, but the basis for the recovery has undergone a change.
The husband's right to recovery seems now to be based more on the
idea that he has suffered a personal and pecuniary loss from the
invasion of the marriage relation, by the loss of his wife's companionship and the habitual household services 5 she was wont to
perform for him, than on the idea of an invasion of the common
law rights over his wife's person. 6 This change from the common
'3 Blackstone 142.
4 Property of married woman secured to her, C. S. sec. 2506, N. C. Const.
1868, art. X, sec. 6; Capacity to contract, C. S. sec. 2507 (Martin Act. 1911) ;
Earnings of married women and damages recovered for personal torts are her
sole and separate property, C. S. sec. 2513 (1913).
'The recent case of Glanville v. the C. R. I. and P. Ry. Co. (1923) 196
Iowa 456, 193 N. W. 548 seems to hold also that a wife can recover damages
resulting from her inability to perform her household duties as the Court holds
that "the Iowa statute permitting a woman injured by negligence to recover
for loss of time allows a married woman recovery for impairment of her
capacity for manual labor as a wife and mother."
'Holleman v. Harward (1896) 119 N. C. 150, 34 L. R. A. 803, 25 S. E.
972, gives recovery to the husband for loss of companionship and services of
wife caused by defendant continuing to sell drugs to his wife over his protest.
The Court speaking through Justice Montgomery says "A married woman notwithstanding her greatly improved legal status still owes to the husband the
duty of companionship and of rendering all such services in his home as her
relation of wife and mother require her."
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law holding is seen in the many cases now holding that the husband
can recover only for a direct and intentional invasion, and not where
there is negligence alone causing the injury to his right of consortium.7 The reasons for this holding are that the right of action
is vested in the person injured, or the personal representative in case
of action for wrongful death, and to allow the other spouse to recover
would be allowing two recoveries for the same cause of action; also
the damages caused by loss of consortium through negligence are too
remote and consequential to allow recovery therefor.
It is now well settled in practically every jurisdiction that the
wife has a right to the consortium of her husband and can recover
when there has been an intentional and direct invasion or breach of
the martial relation.8 In every case, however, the recovery was
allowed only where there was an intentional invasion. The right of
the wife to recover in North Carolina for a direct and intentional
invasion is clearly settled.9 The husband's right to recovery for loss
of consortium was also settled, but whether he could recover for an
invasion of his right to consortium when caused by negligence alone
was a matter of some dispute. Kimberly v. Howland'0 and Bailey
v. Long"' appeared to hold that the husband could recover where the
invasion of the marital relation was not intentional.
This was the situation confronting the Court when the case of
Hipp v. Dupont'2 came up for decision. In that case the plaintiff's
husband had already recovered in Virginia for his personal injuries
alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence; and the
Whitcomb v. R. R. (1913) 215 Mass 440, 102 N. E. 663; Bernhartv. Perry

(1919) 276 Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462; Blair v. Seltner Dry Goods Co. (1915) 184
Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724; Feneff v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. (1909) 203 Mass

289, 89 N. E. 436.

8
Brown. v. Browzm (1899) 124 N. C. 19, 32
plaintiff's husband); Torner v. Heavrin (1918)
action in the nature of criminal conversation
Geroinini v. Brunelle (1913) 214 Mass. 492, 102

S. E. 320 (Sale of drugs to
182 Ky. 65, 206 S. W. 23,
for adultery with husband;
N. E. 67, 46 L. R. A. N. S.

465, alienation of husband's affection.
'Brown v. Brovn (1899) 124 N. C. 19, 32 S. E. 320.
" Kimberly v. Howland (1906) 143 N. C. 398, 7 L. R. A. N. S. 545, 55 S. E.
778. Plaintiff's wife had been injured through defendant's negligence and the
Court said "it seems to be well settled that where the injury to the wife is
such that the husband receives a separate loss or damage as where he is put to

expense, or is deprived of the society or services of his wife, he is entitled to
recover therefor, and he may sue in his own name."

'Bailey v. Long (1916) 172 N. C. 661, L. R. A. 1917 B, 90 S. E. 809.

Plaintiff sued defendant for causing wife to catch cold thereby suffering death
by the failure to properly keep his hospital in repair while wife was an inmate
there. The Court allowed the plaintiff to recover for the damages suffered
by him.

'Hipp v. Dupont (1921) 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318, 18 A. L. R. 873.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
plaintiff then brought her action for damages which she alleged she
personally had suffered from the same injury, as: (1) expenses paid
by her, made necessary by her husband's injuries; (2) services performed in nursing and caring for him; (3) loss of support and maintenance; (4) loss of consortium; (5) mental anguish. Recovery was
allowed on all five points, including loss of consortium. In regard
to consortium, Chief Justice Cark went deeply into the subject of
married women's rights, and concluded that to-day the rights arising
out of marriage were identical for the wife and the husband. He
then cited cases which apparently held that the husband had the right
to recover for loss of consortium when caused by negligence alone. 13
Thereby, he reached the natural conclusion that a wife could recover
for loss of consortium, even though there was no direct and intentional invasion. The case was new and gave rise to much comment. 14
The late Dean McGehee disapproved the holding as to recovery for
loss of consortium, for the reason that the damages were too remote.
In commenting on this case, he says in part: "Her losses are remote
and consequential. With regard to her husband's consortium, it
is not the natural and probable consequence of a physical injury to
decrease the society, companionship and affection between the
spouses; and loss which results to her can only be because the consortium of which she is still in the enjoyment is less satisfactory and
valuable than formerly. It is remote and consequential."1 5 In
summarizing the cases for and against the holding in the Hipp case
allowing recovery for loss of consortium through negligent injury,
Dean McGehee said:
"The Hipp case says: 'Our precedents established that such
damages are not remote for the husband, and on parity of reasoning
they are not remote for the wife.'
"The opposing cases say: 'Such damages can be recovered by
neither spouse. To allow the wife to recover for merely consequential unintentional losses resulting from negligent injury to the
husband is opposed to the principle refusing consequential and remote
damages and is not supported by any analogous line of cases. Old
precedents allowing the husband to recover for injuries to the wife
avail nothing, as they are founded on a barbarous exploded theory
Kimberly v. Howland and Bailey v. Long, supra, notes 10 and 11.

1422 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (favorable to Hipp case). 35 Harvard Law Rev. 343
(approves Hipp case). 1 N. C. Law Rev. 34 (disapproves Hipp case).

. " Wife's separate action for personal injury to Husband, 1 N. C. Law Rev.
34, 35.
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of the husband's ownership of the wife at a time when she was
considered an inferior."'16
The same question came up for decision again in Hinnant v.
Power Co.,17 in which the husband was killed through the defendant's negligence, whereas in the Hipp case, the husband survived the
injuries. This distinction did not affect the result, as the principles
of law involved are the same. In the Hinnant case, the personal
8
representative of the plaintiff's husband had already brought suit'
under the North Carolina statute, 19 giving an action for wrongful
death resulting from defendant's negligence. Judgment was recovered against the defendant Power Company, and it had been paid.
The plaintiff then brought her action to recover damages for loss of
consortium and for mental anguish resulting from her husband's
death caused by the same negligence. Justice Adams, in a learned
and searching opinion, followed the Hipp case to the extent that the
husband and wife have equal statutory rights of recovery for loss of
consortium. But after a review of the authorities 20 used to support
the Hipp case, it was held that the Common Law right of the husband to recover for every invasion of the right of consortium had
been done away with by the Married Womens Acts, and that now
the husband could only recover for a direct and intentional invasion.
That the damages by loss of consortium from negligent injuries,
whether death results or not, are too remote and consequential.
Therefore, since the husband could not recover for negligent invasion of the consortium, neither could the wife, and especially as
she did not have this right at common law and it had not been given
to her by any statute. Neither was the wife allowed to recover for
mental anguish suffered, since, in the language of the court, "mental
anguish unrelated to any other cause of action, is not sufficient basis
for the recovery of substantial damages."
1I1 N. C. Law Rev. 34, 36.

v. Power Co. (1924) 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307.
187 N. C. 288, 121 S. E. 540.
1
'C. S. 160.
The Court, intimating that these cases were not authority to uphold Hipp
v. Dupont, said of Kimberly v. Howland, "We do not understand that decision
to be authority for the position that the husband has the legal right, without
'Hinnant

"Hinnant v. Power Co. (1924)

regard to the loss of his wife's services, to recover remote and consequential
damages arising from her personal injury."

The recovery in Bailey v. Long was held to be based on a contractual right
between the plaintiff and defendant whereby the defendant should have taken
proper care of plaintiff's wife while an inmate in defendant's hospital.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Hipp v. Dupont21 is clearly overruled, but husband and wife are

left on an equal footing. Either husband or wife may recover for
loss of consortium where there has been an intentional and direct
invasion, but neither husband nor wife may recover for negligent
invasion of the consortium.
C. G. B.
ATTACHMENT OF STOCK IN FOREIGN CORPORATION-In Parks v.

Express Co.,' the defendant, a Georgia corporation, doing an
express business in this state and having property herein, incurred a
liability to a shipper for breach of its contract for the transportation
and delivery of a shipment. The defendant corporation afterwards
became absorbed in the American Raiway Express Company, a Delaware corporation, carrying on the same business with the same
property as the defendant company. It was held that stock in the
American Railway Express Company belonging to the defendant was
subject to attachment in this state, where the cause of action arose,
and the fact that the certificates of stock were not physically within
the state was immaterial.
The problem suggested by the decision is whether shares of stock
owned by a non-resident in a foreign corporation are subject to
attachment in this state, when the corporation carries on business
and has property here, even though the stock certificates are not
within the state.
The defendant resisted the attachment upon the ground that the
sections of the Consolidated Statutes 2 under which the action was
brought did not authorize such attachment, and, if it did attempt to
do so, it was beyond the legislative power. Attachment, being an
extraordinary and summary remedy, a strict compliance with the
statutory provisions is usually required,3 although there are cases
which hold that an attachment will not be dissolved where there is
substantial compliance with the statute.4 In either case, the law of
the state in whose courts the remedy by attachment is sought must
'Parks v. Express Co. (1923) 185 N. C. 428, 117 S. E. 505.
'C. S., secs. 816, 817, 818, 819.
'Carson v. Woodrow (1912) 160 N. C. 143, 75 S. E. 996; Parker v. Scott
(1870) 64 N. C. 118; Leak v. Moorman (1868) 61 N. C. 168.
' In other North Carolina cases the court, having regard to the intent of the
legislature, inclined to the liberal construction, independently of express
statutory provision. When it appears from the whole record that the statute
has been substantially complied with, the attachment will not be dissolved.
Best v. British and American Mortgage Co. (1901) 128 N. C. 351, 38 S. E.
923; Grant v. Burgwyn (1878) 79 N. C. 513.
" See note 12, supra.
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be complied with before a court can assume jurisdiction. But assuming such a compliance with statutory provision, there remains the
larger question of jurisdiction over the property attached. A court
must have power over the property, or, in other words, the property
attached must be within the jurisdiction of the court.
JurisdiFtion refers both to the power of the court to move in any
event by means of this particular process-jurisdiction over the subject matter-and also to the authority of the court to move in the
proceeding, as dependent upon compliance with the formalities prescribed or the existence of the necessary grounds at the time the
remedy is asked for. As in other actions in rem, the proceeding in
attachment is based upon a claim to property and jurisdiction does
not exist unless a claim to property is made the basis of the suit.
Since the object of the suit is to obtain property, the court having
power over the property has jurisdiction to maintain the suit. The
court cannot exercise its jurisdiction unless there is property upon
which it can operate.5 The issue of the writ and its levy upon
property within the state bring the property within the jurisdiction
of the court and also give the court jurisdiction over the defendant
to the extent of his interest in the property.
Where the property attached is a chattel or any tangible personal
property, no difficulties arise in determining jurisdiction over the
property, as presence within the state is sufficient. The determination of the situs of a chattel is a question of fact, and jurisdiction
depends upon the chattel being within the state.8
Where the property attached is a debt, the presence of the debtor
is held to be enough to confer jurisdiction. The situs of a debt for
purposes of attachment is said to be with the debtor.7 Thus a debt
may be attached if,
there is a general law which provides for the
attachment of debts and if the garnishee is found and process personally served upon him within the state. "It seems to be conceded
that if the creditor of the garnishee can sue the latter in this state,
then the plaintiff can proceed here against the garnishee." 8 Although
there are serious objections to this, the rule is well established, and a
judgment against the garnishee in such a case is entitled to full faith
and credit.9
'Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) 95 U. S. 714; Woodruff v. Taylor (1847) 20 Vt.
65; Balk v. Harris (1898) 122 N. C. 64, 30 S. E. 318; Green v. Van Buskirk
(1866) 5 Wall 307, 18 L. Ed. 599.
'Sutherland v. Bank (188Y) 78 Ky. 250.
T

Harrisv. Balk (1904) 198 U. S. 215.

8 Goodwin v.

Claytor (1905) 137 N. C. 224, 231, 49 S. E. 173.

'Harris v. Balk (1904) 198 U. S. 215, reversing Balk v. Harris (1902) 130
N C. 381, 41 S. E. 940.
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When shares of corporate stock are sought to be attached, a question arises as to the situs of such stock. The common law rule,
supported by a great majority of state decisions, is stated as follows:
"Corporate stock, for the purpose of attachment, has its situs where
the corporation is located, and shares of stock in a foreign corporation cannot be attached, even though the corporation is carrying on
business within the state. Capital stock of a domestic corporation is
subject to attachment, although it is owned by a non-resident, or
although the certificate of stock is in the possession of a debtor outside the state."' 0 "Shares of stock in a corporation are personal
property, whose location is in the state where the corporation is
created.

.

.

.

For purposes

of attachment under the usual

statute, stock is located where the corporation is incorporated.
The shares owned by a non-resident defendant in the stock
of a foreign corporation cannot be reached and levied upon by virtue
of an attachment.

.

.,

Under the modem view, expressed in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, shares of stock have a situs wherever the stock certificates
are found. Stock certificates acquire the character of negotiable
instruments, requiring a transfer of the certificate in order to change
ownership. The Stock Transfer Act provides that no levy or attachment of stock shall be good until the certificate is seized or its transfer by the holder is enjoined. This view has been developing under
modern business conditions, and the certificates are looked upon as
2
the stock itself.'
In most jurisdictions today, stock may be attached where the
certificates are found or else at the domicile of the corporation. But
in the principal case, neither of these conditions were present. The
garnishee was a foreign corp6ration, and no certificates of stock in
that corporation belonging to the defendant were found in North
Carolina.
In North Carolina, as well as in all jurisdiction, attachment is
authorized against the property of the defendant. 13 If there is no
property of the defendant within the jurisdiction, an attachment
cannot lie. But the North Carolina statute specifically provides that
"The rights or shares of the defendant in the stock of any association
or corporation, with the interest and profits thereon, and all other
10

Cook, Principles of CorporationLaw, pp. 204, 205.

'Cook, Corporations (8th Ed.) vol. II, p. 1605, sec. 485.
"Simpson v. Jersey City Co. (1900) 165 N. Y. 193; Bellows Falls Power
Co.v. Commonwealth (Mass 1915) 109 N. E. 891.
"C. S., see. 798.
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property in this state of the defendant, are liable to be attached,
levied on and sold to satisfy the judgment and execution. 1 4 In the
principal case, the court held that this section of the statute means
clearly what it says and therefore the shares of the defendant in the
stock of the American Railways Express Company are subject to
attachment. But it may be pointed out that this section also says "all
other property in this state of the defendant," clearly making the
situs of property in North Carolina a prerequisite to attachment.
In Evans v. Monot,15 the nature of a share of stock is discussed
as follows: "A share of stock of the corporation is a thing incorporeal-a mere right-which entitles its owner to participate in the
general management of the concerns of the corporation by being a
member; in the meetings of the stockholders to elect officers and do
other acts of the kind, to demand and receive from the corporation
a dividend of profits, whenever dividends are declared, and to demand
and receive a portion of whatever may be on hand at the dissolution."
That a stockholder is not an owner of corporate property is common
learning. So it becomes difficult to understand the conclusion of the
Court in the principal case, that ". . . the American Railway Express Company, though incorporated in Delaware, was doing business
in this state and subject to its jurisdiction. The shares of stock held
by the defendant in that company was an obligation of the company
doing business here due to its stockholder. It was the 'property of
the stockholder in the hands of the company doing business here.'
Whether it be treated as a liability or obligation of the company
issuing the stock, or as an interest which the defendant owns in
that company and its assets here, it was the 'property' of the defendant, and in either event it was subject to payment of the debts of the
defendant stockholder."' 6
But it is submitted that while the shares of stock owned by the
defendant in the foreign corporation are his property, there is no
possible way to sustain the result that such shares are property in
North Carolina without disregarding the corporate entity. The foreign corporation owned property in North Carolina consisting of
equipment, trucks, franchises, etc. It seems to be going too far to
say that the defendant shareholder owned any property in the State.
However this view of the shareholder's interest in corporate property
" C. S., sec. 816.
'Evans v. Monot (1859) 57 N. C. 227.
"Parks v. Express Co. (1923) 185 N. C. 428, 117 S. E. 507.
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is sustained in a more recent case, 17 discussed in the following note,
where the Supreme Court upheld an inheritance tax on stock in a
foreign corporation owned by a non-resident decedent.
B. S.G.
INHERITANCE TAX ON STOCK OWNED BY NON-RESIDENT IN FORa resident of the State of
Rhode Island died owning shares of stock in the R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company which has its principal places of business in this
State, and two-thirds of the total value of its tangible property is
located herein. The Corporation maintains a stock transfer office ir
New York City, and the paper certificates representing the shares of
stock owned by the deceased at the time of his death have never been
in this state. None of the beneficiaries under the will lived in North
Carolina. It was held that these shares of stock were subject to the
North Carolina inheritance tax.
The question faced by the court is: Can North Carolina levy an
inheritance tax upon shares of stock owned by a non-resident decedent in a foreign corporation doing business in this State? Or in
the words of Justice Stacy: "The question, therefore, directly presented is whether the Legislature of this State can impose an inheritance or a transfer tax upon the right of non-resident legatees or
distributees to take by will or receive under the interstate laws of
another state from a non-resident testator or intestate, shares of
stock in the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and to require the
payment of such a tax as a condition precedent to the right to have
'2
said stock transferred on the books of the corporation."
The Supreme Court held that the Legislature had the power to
impose such -a tax. Chief Justice Clark filed a vigorous dissenting
opinion in which he contended that such a tax was unconstitutional.
The decision seems entirely consistent with the adopted policy of
the Supreme Court of North Carolina concerning the nature of a
shareholder's interest in corporate property. This is illustrated by
the discussion in the preceding note concerning the attachment of
stock in foreign corporations.
North Carolina levies a capital stock tax on domestic corporations8 and, since 1921, exempts from taxation in the hands of the
"Trust Co. v. Doughton (1924) 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741.
'Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton (1924) 187 N. C. 263, 121
S. E. 741.
2187 N. C. 263, 265.
'C. S., sec. 7771.
EIGN CORPORATION-In a recent case,'
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individual stockholder shares of stock in corporations which have
already paid a capital stock tax.4 This policy is based on expediency
and economy in the collection of taxes, through the corporation itself
or "at its source," rather than in the hands of the owner. The statute
in 1921 was designed to prevent double taxation, the state choosing
to collect annual property taxes on shares of stock at their source
and exempting them in the hands of the owner.
Under this doctrine North Carolina could not have laid an annual
property tax on the shares in the present case, because the stock
was owned in a foreign corporation and the owner was a non-resident. In other words, North Carolina could not collect at source by
means of a capital stock tax since this was not a North Carolina
corporation.
Since North Carolina could not have levied an annual property
tax on these shares of stock, could it impose an inheritance tax upon
their transfer under the facts of thie case? The answer to this question depends on whether any property was transferred under the
laws of North Carolina. An inheritance tax is not a property tax,
but a tax on the privilege granted by the state of taking by inheritance or will. It is fundamental that under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state has jurisdiction to impose an inheritance tax only when
the exercise of some essential privilege incident to transfer of title
to the property in question depends for legality on the law of that
state. This principle renders the tax in the present case invalid
because no property was transferred in North Carolina or under
North Carolina law. The property in North Carolina did not belong
to the shareholder but to the corporation. "The corporation owned
it prior to the shareholder's death; it continues to hold it after his
death. No succession takes place in North Carolina* and there is
nothing upon which to impose an inheritance tax. What the shareholder owned was a membership in the corporation, a right to his
proportion of the dividends declared if any, and a right to his proportion of the assets remaining after paying debts if the business is
discontinued. The corporation and the shareholder are separate and
distinct." 5
"Since the property belongs to the corporation, not to the shareholder or his successor, both before and after the shareholder's
'Pub. Laws, 1921, Ch. 34, sec. 4. Person v. Watts (1922) 184 N. C. 499,
115 S. E. 336. Taxation,of Stock in North Carolina Corporationsby Walter
J. Matherly, 1 N. C. Law Rev. 203.
'See note, Corporate Stock and Inheritance Taxation, 23 Mich. Law Rev.
272, 273.
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death, and only the intangible interest in the corporation represented
by the shares has changed hands, no transfer has taken place which
depends for its validity in any way upon the laws of the state in
which the property lies (North Carolina in the present case), and
there is consequently no jurisdiction to tax. The courts have, therefore, almost unanimously frustrated these attempts to levy tribute,
declaring either that the statute in question did not sufficiently manifest any such covetous intention on the part of the legislature or that,
a tearing of the corporate veil as to
if it did, it was so shamefaced
06
unconstitutional."
be
There is no doubt in the present case but that the legislature
intended to levy the tax in question.7 The decision is based on the
theory that the decedent shareholder owned property in North Carolina which passed under the laws of this state. That the court proceeded on this theory appears from the following quotation, which is
paraphrased from the language of the court in Parks v. Express Co.8
(discussed in the preceding note) : "In the present case the R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company though incorporated in New Jersey is
doing business in this State and is subject to its jurisdiction. The
shares of stock held by the decedent at the time of his death in that
company was an obligation of the company to its stockholder. It
was the property of the stockholder in the hands of the company
doing business here." But it is submitted that the property in North
Carolina belonged to the corporation and not to the shareholder, and
therefore no property passed under the laws of this state.
The issue presented has not been passed on yet by the Supreme
Court of the United States, but the great weight of state authority
is against the Court's opinion and in accord with the dissenting opinion in Trust Co. v. Doughton,9 on the theory that no property passed
in North Carolina and therefore the state has no jurisdiction to levy
an inheritance tax.10
C. C. P.
'Jurisdiction to Tax Shares of Stock, 38 Harv. Law Rev. 811.
'C. S., sec. 7772.
aParks v. Express Co. (1923) 185 N. C. 428, 117 S. E. 505.
'Trust Co. v. Doughton (1924) 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741.

" Tyler v. Dane County, (1923-Mich.) 289 Fed. 843; State v. Dunlap,

(1916) 28 Idaho 784, 156 Pac. 1141; People v. Dennett (1916) 276 Ill. 43, 114
N. E. 493; Welch v. Treasurer and Receiver General (1916) 223 Mass 8, 111

N. E. 774; State v. Walker (1924-Montana) 226 Pac. 894; In Re McMullen's
Estate (1923) 236 N. Y. 518, 142 N. E. 266; Shepard v. State (1924-Wis.)
197 N. W. 344. See discussions in following notes: 35 Harv. Law Rev. 93;
38 Harv. Law Rev. 291 and 809; 23 Mich. Law Rev. 272.
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LIABILITY OF INFANT FOR INDUCING CONTRACT

BY MISREPRE-

AGE-Some very interesting problems in the law
of infant's contracts are presented in the case of Greensboro Morris
Plan Co. et al. v. Palmer.1 The case involved a suit to recover damages for false representation and deceit. The defendant, aged nineteen, emancipated and married, misrepresented to the plaintiffs that
he was of full age, as his mature appearance might indicate. He
thus induced them to sell him an automobile truck for about $3,000.00, to secure which he executed his note and chattel mortgage
on the truck. He paid to the plaintiffs approximately $2,000.00, of
which $1,200.00 had been made from the use of the truck. The
plaintiffs, in claim and delivery proceedings, seized the truck, which
sold for $700.00.
These facts being alleged by plaintiffs, the defendant moved for
judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the plaintiffs could
not recover either on the contract or in tort and that the defendant
is entitled to recover the sums which he paid to the plaintiffs with
interest.
The above case is one of many similar cases, apparently increasing in number, which are occupying the attention of the courts today.
To recondle the law as laid down in the different jurisdictions is
impossible. This discussion is necessarily limited to infant's contracts in relation to personal property, and will be dealt with under
the following topics:
1. Disaffirmance 'and return of consideration.
2. Estoppel as basis of infant's liability on contract.
3. Liability of infant in action of deceit.
SENTATION AS TO

I.- DISAFFIRMANCE AND RETURN OF CONsIDERATIN-The rule
as laid down in the case referred to above is, that concerning personal property, and excluding contracts for necessaries 2 and such
contracts as a minor is authorized by statute to make,8 an infant may,
during his minority,4 avoid his contracts, and such avoidance when
effected, is irrevocable and renders the contract null and void ab
ijntio .5 This doctrine is in accord with the general rule of modern
Greensboro Morris Plan Co. et al. v. Palmer et al. (1923)

185 N. C. 109,

116 S. E. 121. See also Hight v. Harris (1924) 188 N. C. 329, 124 S. E. 623.
'Jordan v. Coefflelds (1872) 70 N. C. 110.
"C. S., sec. 994 (conveyance by infant trustee).

'Pippin v. Insurance Co. (1902) 130 N. C. 23, 40 S. E. 822.
'Pippin v. Insurance Co., supra.
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law in effect in the majority of American jurisdictions, the later
decisions of the American courts having departed from the law as
laid down in the early cases where the contracts of an infant were
classed as void, voidable and binding, depending upon whether or
not they were beneficial or prejudicial to the best interests of the
infant. 6 The modern rule seems to offer fully as much protection
to the infant as did the old doctrine for he has a legal right to disaffirm his contracts, and his motive for doing so is not a proper
subject of inquiry. 7 However, an attempt on the part of the infant
to rescind his agreement in part is not effective. If he is going to
assert his legal right at all, it must apply to the whole contract.8 The
contracts of an infant are said to be voidable, a North Carolina case
defining this to mean incapable of being enforced at law by the adult
party if the infant pleads his infancy.9 The contract is, however,
capable of being ratified by the infant when he attains his majority.' 0
The general rule, which includes the rule stated above, is that "voidable" as applied to an infant's acts is taken to mean a valid act which
may be avoided, rather than an invalid act which may be confirmed. 1
In other words, the contrct is valid until the infant, by pleading his
infancy, uses the proverbial shield given him by the law on the theory
that until he attains the age of twenty-one years, his judgment is not
so matured that he may be depended upon to act for his best interests;
nor is he able to protect himself from those who may be too clever
for him and would persuade him to act to his own detriment. Thus
the law has given the infant a defense to what would otherwise be a
perfectly valid contract enforceable at law. Therefore, the deed of
an infant is universally agreed to transfer a title though that title is
voidable.' 2 Accordingly the deed or mortgage of a infant, since they
are voidable only" and not void, hold good until some act is done to
disaffirm them, but an infant who has executed a deed of land cannot
631 Corpus Juris 1060.
T

Forsee's Adm'x. v. Forsee (1911) 144 Ky. 169, 137 S. W. 836.
"Roeder v. Simonson et al. (1923) 180 Wis. 155, 192 N. W. 477.

'Skinner v. Maxwell (1871) 66 N. C. 45.
"0Ward v. Anderson (1892) 111 N. C. 115, 15 S. E. 933.

'Williston, Contracts, Vol. 1, sec. 231.
" Baggett v. Jackson (1912) 160 N. C. 26, 76 S. E. 86. Also the indorsement of negotiable paper by an infant payee or indorsee transfers title, and
therefore the infancy of the indorser is no defence to an action by the holder
against the maker. C. S., sec. 3012 (N. I. L.). Nightingale v. Withington
(1818) 15 Mass. 272, 8 Am. Dec. 101.
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make the deed absolutely void or valid by any act of his own before
attaining majority. 13
The acts by which a minor may avoid his contracts differ and
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. Any action
on his part which clearly shows an intent to disaffirm the contract
is sufficient to do so. 1 4 For instance, where the infant brought suit
for the purpose of rescinding his contract and it was alleged in the
complaint that the plaintiff, at the date of his contract with the defendant, was a minor, and the defendant did not deny the allegation,
the court held that the prayer in the complaint disaffirmed the contract.15 On the same principle, a sale or purchase of personal property may be revoked by demanding back or surrendering the property.'0 An offer by an infant to return a horse which he had purchased was held sufficient to rescind the trade although the offer
was refused. The rescission was complete without an actual tender
of the property.' 7 Also notice by an infant of his disaffirmance of
a contract with a partnership is sufficient if this notice is given to
one of the partners.1s The disaffirmance may also take place when
an infant is sued on a contract. By making the plea of infancy, the
infant shows his intention to rescind, which prevents a recovery on
the part of the plaintiff. But an infant may rescind at other times
than when he is sued on a contract. He may disaffirm at any time
during his minority.' 9 The fact that the law in regard to the avoidance of contracts, pertaining to personal property is different from
the law in regard to real property, is probably to be accounted for
by the transient nature of personal property, by the ability of the
parties to transfer certain kinds of personal property from place to
place and by the fact that if an infant were not allowed to rescind
such a contract until he became of age, so far as practical results are
concerned, this would be equivalent to removing altogether his right
to disaffirm.
"McCormick v. Leggett (1861) 53 N. C. 425. In case of grants of land,
the effect of disaffirmance is to suspend the matter until the infant becomes
of age.
131 C.J. 1068.
Skinner v. Maxwell, supra, note 9.

"14 R. C. L. 237.
'Bombardier v. Goodrich (1920) 94 Vt. 208, 110 Atl. 11.
"Spenser v. Collins (1909) 156 Cal. 298, 104 Pac. 320.
"Note 4, supra. As to reasonable time for disaffirmance after majority, see
Weeks v. Wilkins (1904) 134 N. C. 522, 47 S. E. 24; Faircloth v. Johnson

(1925) 189 N. C. 429, 127 S. E. 346.
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In taking up the subject of the return of consideration, several
conditions have been assumed which cover the majority of cases in
regard to this matter and state the general rules now applying. The
law on this question is so complicated that it would be impracticable
to go into details in a note of this length. The above rule which
states that any act on the part of the infant which clearly shows an
intent to disaffirm is sufficient, seems to warrant the inference that a
tender by the infant to the other party of the consideration received
from him is not a condition precedent to disaffirmance. Therefore,
the right of the infant to rescind his contract, his right to recover
any consideration that may have passed from him and his obligation to return the consideration that he has received are three separate
and distinct propositions though in most cases, for practical purposes,
they are taken as one. If an infant has entered into a contract with
an adult whereby each party received consideration and later he disaffirms the contract, the disaffirmance, when effective, renders the
contract void ab initio and thereby restores the specific consideration, or any part of it that remains in the hands of the infant, to
the person from whom it was obtained. 20 That is, the infant cannot disaffirm without vesting a right in the other party to recover
the consideration. Some jurisdictions leave upon each party the
burden of demanding that which he has parted with. 21 Others, presumably to prevent any increase in litigation, require the infant to
offer as a condition of disaffirmance, so much of the consideration
as is still in. his possession.22 Suppose that the infant avoids and
attempts to retain the consideration. "His right to avoid cannot be
questioned, but he cannot retain the property purchased and at the
same time repudiate the contract under which he received it; and if
he does repudiate the contract under such circumstances, the title
remains in the vendor and he is entitled to the immediate possession
of the property. Such a refusal to give up the consideration is a
23
wrongful conversion."
oNote 9, supra.
"J*Millsaps v. Estes (1905)

137 N. C. 536, 50 S. E. 227.

This seems the

more logical rule.

= Williston, Contracts, Vol. 1, sec. 19; Reynolds v. Garber Buick Co. (1914)

183 Mich. 157, 149 N. W. 985; Jones v. Valentines School of Telegraphy
(1904) 122 Wis. 318, 99 N. W. 1043. An infant cannot repudiate his contract
and invoke judicial remedies to restore him to his former position, until he
shall have, so far as he reasonably can, made or offered to make restitution.
This rule, however, does not prevent an infant from disaffirming his contract
where he has parted with the consideration and cannot make restitution, Barr v.
Packard Motor Co. (1912) 172 Mich. 299, 137 N. W. 697.
App. 349.
' Bennett v. McLaughlin, 13 Ill.
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The infant is liable in trover or replevin for the return of the
goods, 2 4 and he has the same right to recover the specific res transferred by him to the other party, if it is still in existence. 2 5 If the
other party has transferred it, the infant's right still exists even
against a bona fide purchaser.2 6 If the consideration consisted of
money, and is therefore not traceable, or if the res no longer exists
in specie, he can sue the transferee in quasi-contract for the value
thereof. 27 However, if the infant no longer has possession of the
goods, the vendor cannot maintain replevin and recover a money
verdict for the goods, 28 for the reason that this would be contrary to
the rule that if an infant has spent, consumed, wasted or destroyed the
consideration that he received under'a contract, he may disaffirm his
contract and recover the consideration that passed from him without
restoring any equivalent for that which he received.2 9 Thus where
an infant purchased a horse and wagon and gave a promissory note
in part payment, in a suit on the note he was allowed to recover the
money that he had paid to the vendor although he had sold the horse
and wagon. "To say that he (the minor) shall not have the protection by disaffirmance, with which the law seeks to guard him, unless
he has sufficient prudence to retain the consideration of the contract
he wishes to avoid, would in many instances deprive him, because of
his indiscretion, of the very defense which the law intended that he
should have against the results of his indiscretion." 80 The doctrine
of requiring the infant to return the specific consideration is extended in some jurisdictions so that it may include not only the specific property received by the infant, but if he has exchanged it for
other property of value, which, or a part of which, he still has, the
latter may take the place of the original and come under the same
obligation. 31 "The same reason that impresses the original impresses
the substitute. No question of imprudence or immature folly is in57 L. R. A. 683, note.
Tipton v. Tipton (1850) 48 N. C. 552.
"In regard -to the sale of goods, Downing v. Stone (1891) 47 fo, App.
144; as to land, Jackson v. Beard (1913) 162 N. C. 105, 78 S. E. 6. This rule
as applied to personal property has been changed in those states which have
adopted the Uniform Sales Act.
'Anson, Contracts, p. 192; Waugh v. Emerson (1885) 79 Ala. 295.
"Kay v. Haupt (1917) 63 Pa. Sup. Ct. 16.
"14 R. C. L. 238; Utterstrom v. Kidder (Me.-1924) 124 Atl. 725.
Carpenter v. McGuckian (1920) 43 R. I. 94, 110 A. 402.

"McGreal v. Taylor (1897) 167 U. S. 688, 42 L. Ed. 326; Chandler v.
Jones ct al. (1916) 172 N. C. 569, 90 S. E. 580 discusses the application of
this rule to real property.
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volved. It carries out precisely the same principle of fair dealing
'3 2
as the required restitution of the specific property.
If a minor purchases some article of personal property, such as
an automobile or truck, and uses it for some time it seems unreasonable to allow him to disaffirm without making any allowance whatever for the decrease in the value of the property, yet the rule has
been generally declared to be that an infant, on disaffirming his purchase of personal property returned or tendered back by him, may
recover what he has paid therefor without deduction for the use or
depreciation in the value of the property.3 3 However, the law is
divided on this question. It has been held that where the depreciation
in value exceeded the amount paid in by the infant, he is not entitled
to recover.3 4 Also, an infant rescinding the purchase of a bicycle
and claiming a return of the installments paid upon it must account
for the use of the wheel and the deterioration in value while in his
possession.3 5 These cases seem to rest on the principle .that an infant should be held liable for any benefits that he has received by
the use of the property. They cannot be said to assert the doctrine
that an infant may make a provident contract to purchase that which
is not a necessary. In a New Hampshire case, an infant who had
purchased an automobile was allowed to rescind the contract and
recover the money he had paid toward the purchase price by returning the car and (1) accounting for any benefit he had received from
its use, and (2) paying any damage to the car that was caused by
his tortious acts, but not those caused by his ignorance or unskilfulness in operating the car.36 In a Minnesota case where the contract
was found by the jury to be a reasonable and provident one, the minor
was held liable for benefits.3 7 In a Texas case, a minor was held
not liable for depreciation unless on the ground of tort.33
The North Carolina Court, in the principal case, adhering to the
majority rule, allowed the infant to recover all of the consideration
Whitman v. Allen (1923) 123 Me. 1, 121 A. 160.
Greensboro Morris Plan Co. et al. v. Palner et al., note 1, supra; Utterstrom v. Kidder, note 30, supra; also Creer v. Active Automobile Exchange,
Inc. (Me.-1923) 121 A. 888; Hauserv. Marmon Chicago Co. (1917) 208 Ill.
App. 171. 11 L. R. A. 491, note, gives this as the majority rule.
' Spandora v. Staten Island Garage (1922) 193 N. Y. S. 392.
"5 Rice v. Butler (1899) 160 N. Y. 275, 55 N. E. 275. Indiana and Oregon
are in accord-see 11 L. R. A. 494, n.
"Lavoie v. Woolridge (1918) 79 N. H. 21, 104 A. 346.
"tBerglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co. (1916) 135 Minn. 67, 160
N. W. 191.
,' Mast v. Strahan (Tex.-1922) 255 S. W. 790.
'
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he had paid, although it was shown that about three-fifths of it had
been earned from the use of the truck. Not only was the infant
not obliged to account for the benefits received from the use of the
truck, but he was not charged with any amount to represent the fair
rental value of the truck while used in carrying on his lumber business. Furthermore the infant was not liable in any way for deterioration or depreciation in value of the truck, although it was sold
for less than one-fourth of its original cost.
W. H. A.
II. ESTOPPEL AS BASIS OF INFANT'S LIABILITY ON CONTRACTThe question of estoppel did not arise in the Greensboro Morris Plan
Case,89 but it has occurred with such frequency in similar cases in
other jurisdictions that a short discussion in connection with the
other phases of the case is deemed necessary.
Lord Coke says the name estoppel was given because a man's
own act "stoppeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth. '40 Since
the cases under consideration involve only equitable estoppel or
estoppel in pais, it is unnecessary to go into the various other kinds.
Equitable estoppels are estoppels which "prevent a party from
asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law, where he
has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and
good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth." 41 "The
principle of estoppel is sometimes spoken of as a rule of evidence.
But it is not such; estoppels differ from evidence in this, that the
former are received as conclusive and preclude all inquiry into the
merits of the title, while evidence is merely the medium of estab'42
lishing facts which do exist or have existed.
It can be said in general that the doctrine of estoppel does not
apply to an infant even though he is capable of exercising discretion. 43 However, there are cases that are exceptions to this rule,
or deny its application where the conduct of the infant, on which the
estoppel is sought to be based, was intentional and fraudulent, and
the infant, at the time, had reached an age when he is capable of
"See note 1, .mpra.
*'Martinv. Maine Cent. R. Co. (1890) 83 Me. 100, 21 AtI. 740.
"Hallowell Nat'l Bk. v. Marston (1893) 85 Me. 488, 27 Atd. 529

1-21 C. J. 1060.
"Miller v. St. Louis R. Co. (1915)

188 Mo. A. 402, 174 S. W. 166.
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exercising discretion. 44 In some cases where, in addition, benefits
have been appropriated to his advantage, a form of equitable estoppel
4
also arises. 5
For an estoppel to arise against an infant, all the elements of
estoppel must be present. The conduct of the infant must be fraudulent and misleading, and it must have been believed, relied on, and
acted upon by the other party.
As a general rule, the doctrine of estoppel not being applicable
to infants in so far as voidable transactions are concerned, the courts
are in no haste to hold that the acts of an infant create an estoppel
against him to disaffirm his acts or transactions where the facts are
at all consistent with a contrary opinion. 4 6 Clearly, if he cannot be
estopped himself, neither will the acts or admissions of other persons
estop him.47 Some authorities, however, which maintain this doctrine assert the right of estoppel against him, where, by his conduct
he has led others to act to their prejudice in dealing with persons
other than himself, and it is generally held that if an infant has
reached years of discretion and wilfully and intentionally conducts
himself so that the other party in good faith relied upon his conduct
to his detriment, he may be estopped from avoiding his acts or
48
transactions, at least unless he returns the consideration.
On the question as to what effect a false statement as to age has
upon a voidable transaction, where the other party to the transaction
relies thereon, there is a conflict. In the jurisdictions representing
the weight of authority, it is held that the fact that an infant falsely
represented himself to be of age to the one with whom he dealt
does not estop him from disaffirming the contract and setting up
the defense of infancy against the enforcement thereunder. 49 In
" Harnon v. Snith (1889) 38 Fed. 482; Lewis v. Van Cleve (1922) 302 Ill.
413, 134 N. E. 804.
"5 Fowler v. Ala. Iron and Steel Co. (1910) 164 Ala. 414, 51 So. 393; Marx
et al. v. Clisby et al. (1901) 130 Ala. 502, 30 So. 517.
"'Sanger v. Hibbard (1900) 104 Fed. 455; Dohms v. Mann (1888) 76 Iowa
723, 39 N. W. 823; George et al. v. Delaney (1904) 111 La. 760, 35 So. 894.
" Clark v. Goddard (1863) 39 Ala. 164, 84 A. D. 777; Missouri Central
Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Eveler et al. (1911) 237 Mo. 679, 141 S. W. 877, Ann.
Cas. 1913 A. 486.
" Snith v. Cole (1912) 148 Ky. 138, 146 S. W. 30.
" U. S. Burdett v. Williams (1887) 30 Fed. 697.

Ark.

Tolin v. Spann (1908) 85 Ark. 556, 109 S. W. 534, 16 L. N. S. 1672.

Conn. Geer v. Hovey (1790) 1 Root 179.
McKainy v. Cooper (1888) 81 Ga. 679, 8 S. E. 812.
Ga.
Ind. Price v. Jennings (1877) 62 Ind. 111.
Mass. Merriam v. Cunningham (1853) 11 Cush. 40.
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other jurisdictions, such false representations may give rise to an
estoppel.5 0 All elements of estoppel must be present, and the other
party to the transaction must act in good faith especially if the situation and appearance of the alleged infant at the time were such as
tended to substantiate the statement as to his full age.
The former jurisdictions have the weight of authority with them,
but the latter seem to have the better reasoning. A few well-considered cases on both sides will illustraie this point.
The New York court held that if an allegation that the infant
represented that he was of full age "were even permitted to destroy
an infant's right of avoiding contracts, not one in a hundred of his
contracts would be placed in his power to avoid, for nothing would
be easier than to prevail upon the infant to make a declaration which
might be shown as evidence of deliberate imposition on his part,
though prompted solely by the person intended to be benefitted
by it."51
Merriam v. Cunningham held that "the fraud of the defendanc,
if ever so clearly shown, does not restore validity to his promise, or
in any way enhance its obligation. . . . The doctrine contended
for by the plaintiff would effectually deprive infants of that protection which the law sedulously seeks to afford them in their
52
dealings."
It seems logical that an infant who has the appearance of an
adult; who fraudulently misrepresents his age; and who is intelligent enough to appreciate the fraud, and set up his infancy, should
Minn. Folds v. Allardt (1886) 35 Minn. 488, 29 N. W. 201.

N. H. Burley v. Russell (1839) 10 N. H. 184, 34 A. D. 146.
N.Y. Conroe v. Birsall (1799) 1 Johns. Cas. 127, 1 A. D. 105.

N. C. Carolina Intcrstate Bldg. and Loan Asso. v. Black (1896) 119
N. C. 323, 25 S. E. 975.
Penn. Frank Spangler Co. v. Haupt, 53 Pa. Super. 545.
S. C. Norris v. Vance (1846) 37 S. C. L. (3 Rich.) 164.
Vt.
Whitcomb v. Joslyn (1878) 51 Vt. 79, 31 Am. Rep. 678.
Eng. Lesley v. Sheill (1914) 3 K. B. 607, 6 B. R. C. 738.
Ky.
Looney v. Elkhorn Land Co. (1922) 242 S.W. 27.
La.
Guidry v. Davis, 6 La. Ann. 90.
Miss.
Commander v. Brazil (1906) 88 Miss. 668, 41 So. 497, 9 L. N.
S.1117.
Neb.
Klinck v. Reeder (1921) 107 Neb. 342, 185 N. W. 1000.
N.J.
La Rosa v. Nichols (1918) 92 N. J. L. 375, 105 Atl. 201, 6.
A. L. R. 412.
Texas
Kilgore v. Jordan. 17 Tex. 341.
Australia. Campbell v. Ridgley, 13 Vict. L. 701.
Conroe v. Birdsall (1799) 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 127, 1 Am. Dec. 105.
"Merriam v. Cunningham (1853) 11 Cush. (Mass.) 40.
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be liable on an action of contract. Lord Mansfield remarked with
much wisdom that the defense of infancy was given as a shield and
not as a sword, and that it should never be turned into an offensive
53
weapon to assist fraud.
Following this line of reasoning, the Louisiana court said, "It is
an error to suppose that the law can sanction the perpetration of
frauds by minors; the truth and reality of bona fide transactions
54
are as binding upon them as upon majors."

In Klinck v. Reeder,55 it was held that a minor, doing business
in his own name and fradulently misrepresenting himself to be of
age, and giving notes in payment for a tractor used in his business,
was not permitted to defeat a recovery on the notes because of his
infancy. The court, in that case, said, "While generally the doctrine
of estoppel in pais is not applicable to infants, yet where an infant
of so mature an age and appearance as makes his statement of being
of age plausible, while actually transacting business for himself,
makes fraudulent and false representations that he is of age to another for the purpose of transacting business with him, and such
other person believes such statements to be true and relies and acts
thereon and parts with his property because thereof, the doctrine of
estoppel in pais will apply and such infant will not be permitted to
set up his minority as a defense to an action to enforce the performance of the contract so entered into."
Another case in accord is Commander v. Brazil.56 It was there
held that an infant, who, after reaching the stage of maturity indicating that he is of full age, enters into a contract falsely -representing himself to be of age and accepts the benefits thereof, is estopped
from denying that he is not of age when the contract is sought to be
enforced against him; the party dealing with him believing him to
be of full age. Justice Calhoon, concurring in the opinion handed
down said, "Recoiling from the multitude of undistinguishable distinctions in the books, I take the law to comport with what is plainly
right. Infants are shielded from their own improvidence, and their
contracts as to them, are of no force except for necessities. But
when a minor whose appearance justifies belief in such, induced a
contract, which is reasonable, by false assurance that he is of the
Zouch v. Parsons (1765) 3 Burr. 1794, 97 Eng. Reprint 1103.
Guidry v. Davis, 6 La. Ann. 90.
Klinck v. Reeder (1921) 107 Neb. 342, 185 N. W. 1000.
88 Miss. 668, 41 So. 497, 9 L. N. S. 1117.
' Commandcr v. Brazil (1906)
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age of majority, he should be, and is compellable to carry it out, or
to fully restore the status quo by returning that which he has received and making counpensation if he has wasted it."
In four of the states of the union, statutes have been passed (that
of Iowa being the original) providing, in identical language, that an
infant cannot disaffirm his contracts in cases where, on account of
the minor's own misrepresentations as to his majority, or from his
having engaged in business as an adult, the other party has good
57
reason to believe him (the minor) capable of contracting.
Mere failure to give notice of the fact of infancy without any
misrepresentations upon the subject or any intent to defraud has
been held insufficient to create an estoppel, although the infani
appeared to be of age, and was believed by the other party to be
so. 58 However, there is authority to the effect that if the infant has
arrived at years of discretion and under the circumstances of the
case it was his duty to disclose his minority, he may be estopped
by his failure to do so. 52
Although the above cases are in the minority and do not represent the North Carolina view, yet the principles involved seem to be
correct and the conclusions desirable. To adopt this view is not to
take away the infant's power to disaffirm his contracts generally. It
means that in a limited field of cases, and only then when certain
facts are present, will the infant be bound by his contracts. The
doctrine by which this is accomplished is equitable estoppel.
H. A. B.
III.

LIABILITY OF INFANT IN ACTION OF

DECEIT-Ve have seen

that infants have always occupied a favored place in the common law.
At first, infants were subject to no liability for their torts, except
those that were wilful and opposed to the public peace. This indulgence, however, was ere long taken away, with the result that, by
unquestioned authority in all common law jurisdictions, infants are
now held for all their torts which are not connected with contract"pure torts" or "torts simpliciter"-on an equal basis with adults,
Iowa Code, sec. 3190; Kan. Gen. St. sec. 4184; Utah Rev. St., sec. 1543;
Wash. Gen. St., sec. 4532.

' Grauman, Marx and Cline Co. v. Kreinitz (1910)

142 Wis. 556, 126

N. W. 50.
- Bank of Oakwood v. Edwards (Texas, 1922) 245 S. W. 478.
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no distinction being made between infants and adults in that
60
respect.
But it has always been the established policy of the common law
to protect infants in the use of their property; and since by lack of
mature business sense an infant may often be induced to make a
contract that would be clearly against his interests, the law makes
the contracts of infants voidable, and gives them the privilege of disaffirming such contracts, either before or after the attainment of
majority. 61 Such avoidance renders the contract null and void ab
initio, and the right to disaffirm may be exercised at the infant's discretion. This principle is today universally recognized, and, with the
exception of a few jurisdictions, is not altered by circumstances
which would give rise to an estoppel, as discussed in the preceding
section.
Each of these principles is in itself simple enough, and in those
cases where only one rule is applicable there is no difficulty. But
frequently we find cases arising where elements of tort and of contract are involved in the same set of facts. As to these cases the
courts are inclined to hold the contract immunity of an infant more
inviolable than his tort liability. And accordingly, they all agree that
the infant cannot be held in a tort action, if by so doing he is indirectly required to carry out his disaffirmed contract. 62 This rule is
simple enough and undisputed, but nevertheless a great conflict of
opinion has arisen in regard to its application-a situation which is
due chiefly to a disagreement as to when the tort is inseparably connected with the contract.
There are several types of cases in which the application of the
rule is relatively simple. For instance, an infant is not held for a
false warranty in regard to the nature or quality of goods which he
has sold, for in such a case the fraud is clearly a part of the contract
itself. The false statement is about the subject matter of the con' 1 Cooley, Torts, page 177; 2 Kent. Com. 241; Moore v. Horne (1910)
153 N. C. 415, 69 S. E. 409; Kron v. Smith (1887) 96 N. C. 393, 2 S. E. 533.
'1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 226, p. 443; Pippen v. Insurance Co. (1902)
130 N. C. 23, 40 S. E. 822; Norwood v. Lassiter (1903) 132 N. C. 56, 43 S. E.
511. An exception is made to the rule in the case of contracts for personal
necessities, and contracts permitted by statute.
"Barnes v. Harris (1852) 44 N. C. 15; Poe v. Home (1853) 44 N. C. 398;
Collins v. Gifford (1911) 203 N. Y. 465, 96 N. E. 721.
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tract, and the person who relies on such a warranty does so at his
68
peril.
Again, when an infant holds property under a contract of bailment and through his ignorance or negligence injures it, he is not
liable in tort, 64 for here again the damage to the property arises
through a risk incident to the contract of bailment itself, and the
other contracting party must consider such loss as one to which he
had given his consent. As to whether an infant holding property
under a bailment is liable for damage to such property caused by his
willful act, there is a conflict in the authorities. In most of the jurisdictions the infant is held accountable for such willful and positive
wrongs, notwithstanding the contract, the courts going on the belief
that the wrongful act is so separate from the contract itself that the
plea of infancy is not applicable."6 The act in question is held not to
be strictly related to the contract or its performance, but clearly outside the bounds of it. However, in at least two jurisdictions we find
the courts holding the opposite view, on the ground that it is impossible to enforce a tort liability without taking notice of the contract
and that the privilege of disaffirmance cannot be undermined in any
such indirect manner. 66
As to contracts other than bailments-as, for example, to perform work-there are cases which hold, on what seems to be just
and logical grounds, that if the infant is negligent in the manner in
which he performs his contract he should not be held accountable
for losses resulting from his carelessness, for the wrong is clearly
61
inseparable from the contract.
The most interesting cases and those in greatest disagreement
are those in which we find the infant resorting to fraudulent repreWest v. Moore (1842) 14 Vt. 447, 39 Am. Dec. 235; Collins v. Gifford
(1911) 203 N. Y. 465, 96 N. E. 721. Contra-Word v. Vance, (S.C.-1818) 1
Nott. and McC. 197, 9 Am. Dec. 683.
" Stack v. Cavanaugh (1892) 67 N. H. 149, 30 Atl. 350; Brunhoel.l v.
Brandes (1917) 90 N. 5. L. 31, 100 Atl. 163. Contra-Daggyv. Miller (1917)
180 Iowa 1146, 162 N. W. 854.
The leading case is Vasse v. Smith, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 226, 3L. Ed. 207,
opinion by Marshall, C. J.; Homer v. Thwing, 3 Pick (Mass.) 492; Towne v.
Wiley, 23 Vt. 355. Here an infant hired a horse to go a certain distance. He
returned by a circuitous route nearly double the distance and left the horse out
over night so that it died from over-driving and exposure. The infant was
held liable, for the reason that he had gone outside the scope of the bailment.
'Schenck v. Strong (1818) 4 N. J. Law 87; Penrose v. Curren (Pa.1832) 3 Rawle 351, 24 Am. Dec. 356.
"Lowery v. Cate (1901) 108 Tenn. 54, 64 S. W. 1068; Caswell v. Parker
(1901) 96 N. E. 39, 51 Atl. 238.
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sentations in order to induce another to contract with him. Most of
the cases involving this point have arisen where the infant either
expressly or impliedly represented himself to be of full age and
where the other party, relying on the infant's statement, entered into
the contract, only to find the infant later failing to perform and
setting up the plea of infancy. Of this type of case, Greensboro
Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer08 is typical. Here again the courts all
admit the rule that if the infant cannot be held in an action ex cantractu, he cannot be required to carry out his contract by the indirect
method of resorting to an action sounding in deceit. But the cases
disagree on the point whether allowing a tort action would be enforcing his contract. The authorities are in such conflict that it is futile
to try to reconcile them. The best we can do is to recognize the two
lines of cases and to examine the reasoning upon which each rests.
For convenience we will arbitrarily designate as the "English view"
that which refuses to hold the infant in tort. The opposite view
we will call the "American view," although it shares with the English
view a large following in this country.
It seems that the question first definitely presented itself in 1665
in the famous"case of Johnson v. Pye,69 which has serevd as a guide
for all the subsequent cases following the English rule. According
to a report of that case,
"The defendant affirms to the plaintiff that he was of full age, on which
the plaintiff lends him money. And he takes his security (a mortgage) when
in truth he was only twenty and a half. Then he avoids his security. And a
difference was taken between torts and contracts of infants, for though infants will not be bound for contracts, yet they will be bound for torts. But
though infants will be bound for actual torts, as trespass, etc., which are vi et
contra 'pacem, yet they will not be bound for those which sound in deceit, for
if they should be, all the infants in England would be ruined"'
This early case has been the basis for numerous later decisions,
and now the unquestioned law in England is that the infant who induces a contract by fraudulent statements as to his age is not liable,
either in contract or in tort, the reason, as shown, being that a tort
1
action would indirectly enforce the contract.7
"See note 1, supra.
oJohnson v. Pye (1665) Siderfin Pt. 1, p. 258, 1 Keble 913, 1 Lev. 169.
70Siderfin, pt. 1, p. 258. See Keeling, J., in 1 Keble 913, "Also by this means
all the pleas of infancy would be taken away, for such affirmations are in
every contract."
"Price v. Hewitt (1852) 8 Excheq. 146, 17 Jur. 4, 57 L. R. A. 676n.
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This view has a large following in the United States, a recent
important and often quoted case being Slayton v. Barry.t2 The
Massachusetts court said: "In the present case it seems to us that
the fraud on which the plaintiff relies was part and parcel of the
contract and directly connected with it. The plaintiff cannot maintain his action without showing that there was a contract," etc. This
is a good statement of the principle ruling in the numerous cases in
several jurisdictions, and the principle upon which the Greensboro
Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer is decided.
But though, as we have seen, the English rule met with strong
support in this country, there is a very decided contrary view. As
73
early as 1838 the New Hampshire court, in Fitts v. Hall, expressly
repudiated the doctrine of Johnson v. Pye. Since this case is the
fore-runner of practically all the American cases in accord and also
because it states clearly the principles upon which these cases go, we
again quote at length:
"The next question is, whether this action can be maintained against the
defendant for the fraudulent representation that he was of full age, by reason
of which the plaintiff was induced to sell him the hats. . . . There is no
sound reason that occurs to us why an infant should not be chargeable in damages, for a fraudulent misrepresentation whereby another has received damage. But the representation in Johnson v. Pye, and in the present case, that
the defendant was of full age, was not a part of the contract nor did it grow
out of the contract, or in any way result from it. It is not any part of its
terms, nor was it the consideration upon which the contract was founded.
No contract was made about the defendant's age. The sale of the goods was
not a consideration for this affirmation. The representation was not a foundation for an action of assumpsit. The matter arises purely cx delicto. The
fraud was intended to induce and did induce, the plaintiff to make a contract
for the sale of the hats, but that by no means makes it a part and parcel of
the contract; and if an infant is liable for a positive wrong connected with a
contract, but arising after the contract has been made, he may well be answerable for one committed before the contract was entered into, although it may
have led to the contract."

'2Slayton v. Barry (1900) 175 Mass. 513, 56 N. E. 574, 49 L. R. A. 560.
This case is inherently of doubtful soundness, for its supporting cases seem to
be distinguishable on their facts. In one of them, Gilson v. Spear (1865)
38 Vt. 311, 88 Am. Dec. 659, the infant falsely represented that the horse
sold the plaintiff was sound. This is clearly a part of the subject matter of the
contract. Doran v. Smith (1877) 49 Vt. 353 apparently follows Gilson v.
Spear. Another, Nash v. Jewett (1889) 61 Vt. 501, 4 L. R. A. 651, 18 Atl.
47 follows Gilson v. Spear and Doran v. Smith and several inapplicable cases.

But Slayton v. Barry is still the law in Massachusetts, being followed by Ray-

mond v. Cycle Co. 230 Mass. 54, 118 N. E. 359.
"Fitts v. Hall (1838) 9 N. H. 48.
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The doctrine of Fitts v. Hall was accepted as the law in
New York in 1843,7 4 and, after a period of doubt 75 was in 1863
expressly declared the proper rule in a case which again rejected the
English rule as embodied in Johnson v. Pye, and cited in support of
its stand cases from New Hampshire, the United States Supreme
Court, Texas, Maine, and South Carolina. 76 Since that time, the
doctrine has been adopted in a number of other jurisdictions.7 7 The
concensus of opinion is that the fraud is not "part and parcel" of the
contract, and that to allow the exemption would make the defense of
infancy both a shield and a sword, whereas the principles of justice,
and the original purpose of the law, require that it should be only a
shield of defense.
The objection that to hold the infant for his fraud would be an
indirect enforcement of the disaffirmed contract is untenable, for
both of the original contracting parties agree that there is no contract. The infant has disaffirmed it, and the plaintiff has waived it.
The former contract is now treated as a nullity, and the action is
solely upon the fraud. And the amount of the tort liability would
not necessarily be the same as the amount of the contract liability. In
the two cases, the methods of calculating the damages would be
different. 78 In the action in deceit, it is required only that the defendant answer for the actual loss caused by the fraud, and not for
the original purchase price nor for the amount unpaid under the
contract. The infant might have agreed to pay too much, and in
"' Wallace v. Morse, 5 Hill 392.
"Brown v. McCune, 5 Sandf. 222.
" Eckstein v. Frank, 1 Daly 334. This case is expressly followed in Schuneman v. Paradise,46 How. Pr. 426.
" Monumental Building Association No. 2 v. Herman, 33 Md. 128; Yeager
v. Knight (1883) (obiter) 60 Miss. 730. See also cases cited in Anno. Cases
1913 A, 971, and in 1 Williston 481. For contra cases, in accord with Johnson
v. Pye, see 1 Williston 480.
It is uncertain which view has the weight of authority. Cooley says that
it is with the English view, 1 Cooley, Torts, p. 186. Other writers say it is
with the American rule. 57 L. R. A. 676, n; Annotated Cases, 1913 A, 971, n.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Civil Law is in accord
with the American view. It says that if the infant misrepresents his age, "yet
his obligation will nevertheless have the same effect as that of a major." Civil
Law 1. Domat., pt. 1, Bk. 4, title 6, sec. 2, par. 2378.
Note also that the Spanish law says on this point: "The law protects those
who are defrauded, and not those who commit the fraud." Spanish Law, law
6, title 9, partidas 6th.
" Rice v. Boyer (1886) 108 Indiana 472, 58 Am. Rep. 53, 9 N. E. 420. Stacy,
J., in dissenting opinion, Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N. C. 109 at page
120, 116 S. E. 261.
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no case would the plaintiff be allowed to make a profit on the transaction. If in a particular case it should happen that the amount of
damages recoverable in the tort action equals the amount due on
the disaffirmed contract, that would be merely a co-incidence, and as
such it should of course have no weight in establishing a general
rule. If, as in the Morris Plan case, the plaintiff brings his action
for damages to the amount unpaid on the contract, through error or
otherwise, a court of justice should not hold that fact against his
chances for recovery. The jury should be trusted here, as in other
cases, to award the amount of damages properly due under the
circumstances.
Moreover, there is the fundamental rule of contracts that an
agreement procured by fraud is not binding, but is voidable only,
at the option of the party defrauded. 70 To allow the plea of infancy
to prevail in such a case as Morris Plan Co. v. Palnwr is to violate
this principle. It is not contended that the rule must not have exceptions, but certainly in a case of this kind, where the infant has the discretion of an adult and his appearance and other circumstances are
such that a reasonable person is led to believe that he is in fact an
adult, as he claims to be, the injured party should not be deprived
of his usual remedies. Whether the circumstances of the particular
case are such that the plaintiff, as a reasonable person, was justified
in relying on them should be considered a question of fact to be
determined by a jury. Some of the states have reocgnized the
reasonableness of this argument and have removed the possibility of
a miscarriage of justice in such cases by passing statutes providing
that in cases of this kind the infant cannot escape the consequences
of his fraud by resorting to the plea of infancy.80 When this contention is carried out, either by judicial decision or by statute, no
assault is made upon the infant's ancient shield of protection, for in
all cases the law requires the other contracting party to exercise
good faith and reasonable diligence. If he does not, he is not allowed
recovery, and obviously should not be. So the infant is still allowed
his "shield of protection" in those cases where he needs it. He is
merely disarmed of his sword, which he has no just cause to carry.
It is difficult to see the consistency in requiring an infant to be
held for his positive torts, as trespass, trover, etc., and not holding
' Clark, Contracts, page 234; Vanguilder v. Bullen (1912) 159 N. C. 291,
74 S. E. 1059.
' See note 57, supra.
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him in cases of the type under discussion. One is inclined to think
that such a decision is based too much on sensitiveness to precedent,
or supposed precedent. What seems to be the better view is admirably expressed by judge Stacy in his dissenting opinion:
"I hold it to be a sound principle of law, certainly approved in morals,
that an infant who obtains my property by deceit injures me no less than the

infant who negligently destroys that which is mine. If he is liable in the
latter case, where the heart is free from guilt, why should he not be required to
answer in the former, where forsooth his moral turpitude makes the injury
more reprehensible on his part, if not more grievous to me? The absence
of a contract in the one case and its existence in the other is not a sufficient
reason for the difference."'"
Of course, the professed purpose of the law is to protect the
infant in his property and against the wiles of designing persons
who would take advantage of his immaturity. Admittedly, the purpose is admirable enough, and the strict rule prevailing in England
and North Carolina may have been entirely proper and necessary in
the day when it was first promulgated. But reflection reminds us
that conditions in England three hundred and more years ago were
very different from what they are today. Perhaps at that time persons barely under twenty-one years of age might have needed all the
protection allowed by the law. But considering the advances made
in education and civilization since that time, it is obvious that the
youth of today is much more able to take care of himself in business
affairs than an average youth of the same age in that day. 82 The
bulk of our college and university students today is made up of persons not yet twenty-one years of age. The rule, therefore, when
applied strictly as in the Morris Plan case, seem out of date, as well
as unfair. While the very soul of the common law isits regard for
precedent, at the same time it is manifestly true that the law cannot
and does not remain static; it must be capable of making reasonable
adjustment to change. In the field of infants' liability, as in other
phases of the law, we should recognize that changed conditions call
for a new application of well-settled principles.
D. H. D.
185 N. C. 109, 116 S. E. 177.
It is suggestive to recall that at early common law the age of majority
was placed at twenty-five. Later it was reduced to twenty-one.
California has passed a statute, the practical effect of which is to reduce the
age of majority to 18 when the question of return of consideration is involved.
See Spenser v. Collins, note 18, supra.
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